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First Amendment Implications Of Rock
Lyric Censorship
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment identifies the primary and attendant first amend-
ment issues involved in the current movement to rate, regulate or
classify contemporary rock music lyrics. It examines the principal
means of attaining these ends and evaluates the constitutionality, as
well as the feasibility, of each of these means.
There are three principal theories under which it can be argued
that certain rock lyrics are subject to regulation: (1) certain lyrics are
constitutionally unprotected speech because they are obscene, and
may be regulated accordingly; (2) certain lyrics are constitutionally
unprotected speech because they constitute legal incitement, and are
subject to broad regulations; (3) lyrics are protected speech, but may
be regulated in limited ways under the states' police power, including
time, place, and manner restrictions.
This article is essentially a survey of the constitutional and other
legal issues involved. It addresses a number of defenses, and compli-
cations, to the three theories outlined above. With regard to obscen-
ity, the initial problem is in determining whether the lyrics are
legally obscene. In addition, there are vagueness and overbreadth
difficulties inherent in any attempt to define obscene lyrics statuto-
rily. The principal concern with the incitement theory is its basic,
factual applicability. In other words, are those who listen to rock
lyrics being incited in a manner in which the first amendment incite-
ment theory was designed to address?
Finally, the possibility of regulating music pursuant to the state po-
lice powers must be weighed against the listener's constitutional
right to receive information. The comment concludes by describing a
partial agreement that exists among some members of the opposing
sides, and shows it as an example of why legislation is not desirable,
and why non-legislative regulation is not practical.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The current movement to classify, censor, or ban certain rock
lyrics' is the most recent manifestation of a thirty-year conflict2 be-
tween the rock music industry3 and various parental groups.4 The
Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC) - the most vocal and con-
1. Included in the list of offensive lyrics are sexual and obscene references to
genitals, orgasm, masturbation, vibrators and assorted sexual devices, incest, oral and
anal sex, as well as bondage, sodomy, bestiality, sadomasochism, torture, and rape. Vio-
lent lyrics include references to knives, chains, whips, blades, nails, and buzzsaws. A
separate genre addresses the occult, Satan, demons, witchcraft, exorcism, hell, and evil.
In an article on rock censorship, Rolling Stone magazine published a few specific ex-
amples of such lyrics:
'[Flrom the Mentors' "Golden Showers" on their You Axed for it LP: "Listen
little slut/Do as you are told... Come with Daddy for me to pour the gold...
All through my excrements you shall roam ......
... [T]he Rolling Stones' hit album Undercover included the song "Tie You
Up" with the line "Feel the hot cum dripping on your thigh." And Kiss, in
"Fits Like a Glove" from the 1983 gold album Lick It Up, sings, "when I go
through her its just like a hot knife through butter." And Judas Priest in
"Eat Me Alive" from the gold album Defenders of the Faith, sings, "I'm gonna
force you at gunpoint to eat me alive."
Zucchino, Big Brother Meets Twisted Sister: Then Tipper Gore and Zappa Go For
Drinks, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 7, 1985, at 9, 15 (extensive news report concerning the
movement to rate records, the responses of the record industry, and the hearing held
by the Senate Committee on Science, Transportation and Commerce on September 19,
1985).
2. Rock music grew out of blues and jazz as early as the 1940's when white
hillbillies merged so-called "race music" into Rock and Roll. Id. at 15.
Rock music was censored and subjected to investigation as early as the mid-1950's,
around the time of its inception. In 1956, Elvis Presley was televised only above the
waist when he appeared on The Ed Sullivan Show. In the early 1960's the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) along with the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) conducted investigations of various hit songs, among which was "Louie Louie"
by the Kingsmen. The FBI and the FCC played the Kingsmen song at various speeds
to detect pornographic or obscene messages. Their final conclusion was that "no mat-
ter how the song was played, it was utterly incomprehensible." Nightline: Porn Rock
(transcript of ABC television broadcast, Sept. 13, 1985)[hereinafter Nightline].
In the early 1970's, Spiro Agnew conducted a short-lived campaign to ban rock mu-
sic, which he felt promoted drug use and the "drug-culture" from radio broadcasts.
Zucchino, supra note 1, at 15. See also Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (FCC validly gave notice to broadcasters to remind them of their duty
to consider content before airing "drug-oriented" music). In 1972, a federal district
court heard a case in which a municipal ordinance cancelled all rock concerts for the
remainder of 1970 due to fear of premeditated riots. Contemporary Music Group, Inc.
v. Chicago Park Dist., 343 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
3. Among those fighting regulation of lyrics are the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America, music artists, such as John Denver, Donny Osmond, Dee Snider, and
Frank Zappa, the National Association of Broadcasters, various record retailers, lyric
and song publishers, and the Music Television Station (MTV). See Zucchino, supra
note 1; see also Powell, What Entertainers Are Doing to Your Kids, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 28, 1985, at 46 (news report concerning the lyric rating controversy
from a conservative viewpoint).
4. Among those seeking to regulate rock music are such groups as the Parents
Music Resource Center (PMRC), the Songwriter's Guild, the National Education Asso-
ciation (NEA), the National Parent Teachers Association (NPTA), the National Coali-
tion on Television Violence (NCTV), and the National Music Review Council (NMRC)
which is "a nascent organization started by William J. Steding, executive vice-presi-
dent of two radio stations in Dallas and Kansas City, [that] wants to initiate a seal of
approval for acceptable, positive records." Love, Furor Over Rock Lyrics Intensifies,
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spicuous of the pro-control groups 5-purports only to require that
the record industry institute a voluntary classification plan similar to
that currently used by the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA).6 The primary purpose of this system would be to provide
parents with information essential to supervising their children's
viewing and listening habits.
In fact, advocates of a labeling system maintain that the issue has
less to do with censorship than it does with consumer protection. 7
ROLLING STONE, Sept. 12, 1985, at 13, 83 (emphasis added); see also Zucchino, supra
note 1, at 15; Powell, supra, at 47.
In 1982, California Representative Robert K. Dornan initiated a move which would
require warning labels on albums containing backward masking and other hidden
messages. A similar bill was introduced by Republican Assemblyman Phil Wyman of
the California Legislature. See Wash. Post, July 6, 1982, at B3, col. 5; I [heart] Satan?,
Wash. Post, July 10, 1982, at A23, col. 1 (final ed.). Even prior to the current conflict,
some record companies were already placing warning labels on especially offensive al-
bums. Zucchino, supra note 1, at 15.
5. In addition to enjoying the broadest media exposure, the PMRC is also the
best politically-connected of the groups. It includes ten Senators' wives, six Congress-
men, and a Cabinet Secretary. Pareles, Critics View: Should Rock Lyrics Be Sani-
tized?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 2, at 1, col. 1 (late ed.). Among the members of
PMRC is the wife of Senator John Danforth, chairman of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation; this committee conducted hearings on the is-
sue of pornographic lyrics. The PMRC ranks also include the wife of Senator Ernest
Hollings, the wife of Committee member Albert Gore, Jr., Mary Elizabeth "Tipper"
Gore, and Susan Baker, wife of Treasury Secretary James A. Baker. Zucchino, supra
note 1, at 9.
The National Congress of Parents and Teachers has also allied with the PMRC.
This organization has five million members. Pareles, supra, at 1, col. 1.
6. Briefly, this system involves five classifications. Categories are not based on
quality, or lack thereof, but are designed to provide parents with information regard-
ing the films their children may wish to see. There is no real control of audiences,
except in the "X" category. The classes are: "G"-general audiences, all ages permit-
ted; "PG"-parental guidance suggested; "PG-13"-under thirteen to be accompanied
by parent or guardian; "R"-restricted, under seventeen to be accompanied by parent
or guardian; "X"-no one under seventeen admitted. The rating system is not required
by federal or state law, but is entirely voluntary. Mayer, The Motion Picture Classifi-
cation System: An Opinion, N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1983, at 5, col. 1. In fact, "no one is re-
quired to present a film for classification, [although] the great bulk of motion pictures
which are broadly distributed are so presented." Id.
7. "This is a consumer information issue-not a First Amendment issue. These
steps would allow consumers, parents of young children in particular, to make in-
formed decisions through labeling or access to song lyrics. I believe this is an issue of
consumerism, corporate responsibility, and truth-in-packaging." Letter from Senator
Albert Gore, Jr. to Michael Coletti (April 18, 1986).
The PMRC reiterated Senator Gore's sentiment in its statement to the Senate Com-
merce Committee: "A voluntary labeling is not censorship. Censorship implies re-
stricting access or suppressing content. This proposal does neither .... Labeling is
little more than truth in packaging, by now a time-honored principle in our free enter-
prise system." S. Baker & T. Gore, Statement Before the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee, part II, at 2 (Sept. 19, 1985) (emphasis in original).
Obviously, a record label would put the buyer on notice with respect
to potential danger to his mental, emotional, or spiritual health, in
much the same way as a label on a cigarette package warns against
possible dangers to one's physical well-being.
A spokesperson for the PMRC intimates that the organization
seeks only to codify an existent, but informal, ratings system:
What's happening is that in the music industry right now there is labelling,
but it's inconsistent. It is not uniform, it is not standard. I think what the
Parents Music Resource Center would like to see is some sort of uniform
codes so that what is offensive for Warner Brothers records is offensive for
Atlantic and offensive for Columbia.
8
The PMRC largely achieved its original goal. Record companies
have complied with requests to place warning labels on albums which
contain explicit lyrics. 9 By August 5, 1985, Stanley Gortikov, the
President of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),
had convinced nineteen record companies 10 to comply with the pro-
posed labeling system. Mr. Gortikov agreed to continue his efforts to
encourage the remaining RIAA members, as well as nonmember
companies, to cooperate.1 1
However, the PMRC later adopted a plan for a more specific iden-
tification system. Under this system, records would be rated by ref-
erence to the objectionable matter they contained.1 2 This effort was
eventually abandoned in lieu of using the MPAA standards.
To implement the MPAA system the PMRC suggests appointing a
8. Nightline, supra note 4, at 8 (Mrs. Stroud). However, this approach is not uni-
versally accepted without argument. Comparing music to the type of products that are
commonly labeled for consumer protection is overly simplistic. In the same sense that
music can be a conduit for sexual, violent, even insidious messages, it is also a vehicle
for scientific, artistic, and political thought. Obviously, the system which restricts dis-
tribution of information, and thus ideas, must have more far-reaching implications
than that which restricts the sale of a possibly dangerous lawnmower.
In addition, the plan for imposing an MPAA-type system of classification is not as
simple as it first appears. There are pragmatic and legal complexities which belie the
seeming simplicity of transposing a system from one medium of entertainment to an-
other. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the PMRC, and similar groups, have lim-
ited their goals to this one plan. This is evidenced by the failure of several preliminary
proposals by both sides.
9. The inscription reads: "PARENTAL GUIDANCE: EXPLICIT LYRICS."
Zucchino, supra note 1, at 69.
10. Love, supra note 3, at 14. By November 1, an additional firm had agreed to
comply. The list of recording companies included: A&M, Arista, Atlantic, Capital/
EMI, Chrysalis, Columbia, Compleat, Crescendo, Elektra/Asylum, Epic, Manhattan,
MCA, Mike Curb Productions, Motown, PolyGram, RCA, Solar, Scott Bros., Tabu, and
Warner Bros. By the time of the Senate Hearings (September 19, 1985), twenty-four
companies had agreed to the original labeling system. PMRC, PTA & RIAA, Joint
News Release (November 1, 1985) [hereinafter PMRC & RIAA].
11. PMRC & RIAA, supra note 10.
12. Love, supra note 3, at 13. The PMRC's rating system: "D/A" for drugs and
alcohol; "V" for violence; "0" for occult; "X" for vulgar or explicit lyrics. Id. The
PMRC also proposed sample ratings for a select fifteen songs, dubbed "The Filthy Fif-
teen" by Rolling Stone Magazine:
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panel composed of individuals from the music industry and consum-
ers, which would design guidelines and definitions for explicit
lyrics.13 Some albums now are rated with the symbol "PG"; the
PMRC desires to upgrade this to "R."'14
The PMRC also seeks to have questionable lyrics printed on al-
bums and cassettes, to control rock concerts to some degree (or at
least rate them for content), and to have albums with offensive cov-
ers either placed in plain brown wrappers or displayed in an area
away from other records.15 The demands touch upon virtually every
area of the entertainment industry, including television, radio, and
business. Additionally, the PMRC would like questionable videos
bracketed by MTV for late night viewing.16
PMRC member, Mary Elizabeth "Tipper" Gore has stated that if
the music industry is unwilling to compromise further, the PMRC is
ARTIST SONG RATING
JUDAS PRIEST "Eat Me Alive" X
MOTLEY CRUE "Bastard" V
PRINCE "Darling Nikki" X
SHEENA EASTON "Sugar Walls" X
W.A.S.P. "(Animal) F- Like a Beast" X
MERCYFUL FATE "Into the Coven" 0
VANITY "Strap on Robby Baby" X
DEF LEPPARD "High 'n' Dry" D/A
TWISTED SISTER "We're Not Gonna Take It" V
MADONNA "Dress You Up" X
CYNDI LAUPER "She Bop" X
AC/DC "Let Me Put My Love Into You" X
BLACK SABBATH "Trashed" D/A
MARY JANE GIRLS "My House" X
VENOM "Possessed" 0
Id.
13. Zucchino, supra note 1, at 9. Such a panel would include a group of consumers
to represent the community at large. Other panel members would include artists,
broadcasters, distributors, executives, producers, retailers, and songwriters. Id.
14. "[O]n the theory that PG has been watered down by too many PG movies." Id.
15. Id.
16. One of the few commercially successful competitors of MTV, Boston's Channel
V66, does just this. Said David Beadle, program director of V66, "We do not edit any
videos .... We either decide to play them or not. Then we decide when to play them.
In the case of videos that are more adult in nature, we play them after ten o'clock at
night." Love, "Washington Wives" set their sights on Video: Clips Should Carry
Warnings, group says, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 18, 1985, at 18 (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter Washington Wives].
The PMRC has also requested that MTV include a symbol on the TV screen at all
times during the airing of certain videos. Such a symbol would presumably reflect the
rating of any given video. "More radical reform is sought by the National Coalition on
Television Violence (NCTV), a small but strident group that favors government legis-
lation to force broadcasters and cable networks to set aside a percentage of viewing
time for 'nonviolent, nondegrading material.'" Id.
prepared to initiate a plan that would be implemented in every state.
This plan would attempt to form a coalition with the National Par-
ents and Teachers Association, the National Education Association,
and organized labor. The result would be the formation of a national
organization.17
The RIAA maintains that a rating system like the one the PMRC
has in mind is not feasible, and would not be logistically comparable
to the motion picture system:
According to RIAA statistics, roughly 2,500 LPs each with about ten songs,
are released every year, some within days of recording. If a rating system
were imposed all 25,000 songs would have to be rated, because of the possibil-
ity of release as a single. 'We would clearly be looking at a very large staff of
people to rate that many records,' says Robin Ahrold, a vice-president of com-
munications for RCA records. 'Tunes on the same album can be very differ-
ent, and you really can't give a single rating to an LP.'1 8
The president of the RIAA testified at the Senate Hearing concern-
ing the other issues raised by the PMRC, principally by pointing to
the practical limitations of the record industry.19
On September 19, 1985, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation held a hearing to address the record rating
controversy. Members of the music industry, various artists, the
PMRC and other concerned groups attended the hearing and testi-
fied.20 No legislation was proposed, nor was any expected.2 1
17. Love, Battle Over Rock Lyrics Heads For Round Two, ROLLING STONE, Sept.
26, 1985, at 22.
18. Love, supra note 4, at 15, 83.
19. In addition to the logistic difficulties of song-by-song ratings, there are a
number of problems beyond the scope of the RIAA's influence. Because the rights to
lyrics are owned by music publishers-not record companies-they cannot be printed
on albums or cassettes. Zucchino, supra note 1, at 10.
For the same reason, the RIAA cannot provide each radio station with words to
every song. Further, it cannot control what radio stations choose to broadcast. Even
the FCC has difficulty doing this. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(the FCC sought to stop broadcasts of a twelve-minute comedy routine which used ex-
tensive profanity), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
"It cannot control the actions, lewd or otherwise, of rock performers at concerts nor
rate concerts for content, because 'the best control . .. is parental supervision of the
concert attendance of their children.'" Zucchino, supra note 1, at 10 (quoting Stanley
Gortikov's testimony at the Senate Hearing).
The RIAA also has no authority to require that retailers package records or display
them in ways designed to protect younger patrons. Id.
20. John Denver, Dee Snider (lead singer for TWISTED SISTER), and Frank
Zappa testified. Id. Zappa has been particularly vocal. His television appearances in-
clude Nightline and the Phil Donahue show. He has written editorials and has re-
cently released a new album which partially responds to the Hearing, and to the lyric-
rating movement, called Frank Zappa Meets the Mothers of Prevention. It bears
Zappa's own "warning" label, which reads:
WARNING/GUARANTEE: This album contains material which a truly free
society would neither fear nor suppress.
In some socially retarded areas, religious fanatics and ultra-conservative
political organizations violate your First Amendment Rights by attempting to
censor rock & roll albums. We feel that this is un-Constitutional and un-
American.
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III. THE OBSCENITY APPROACH: IF ROCK LYRICS ARE OBSCENE,
THEY ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY UNPROTECTED AND CAN BE
REGULATED ACCORDINGLY
The most effective and certainly the most obvious standpoint from
As an alternative to these government-supported programs (designed to keep
you docile and ignorant), Barking Pumpkin is pleased to provide stimulating
digital audio entertainment for those of you who have outgrown the ordinary.
The language and concepts contained herein are GUARANTEED NOT TO
CAUSE ETERNAL TORMENT IN THE PLACE WHERE THE GUY WITH
THE HORNS AND POINTED STICK CONDUCTS HIS BUSINESS.
This guarantee is as real as the threats of the video fundamentalists who use
attacks on rock music in their attempt to transform America into a nation of
check-mailing nincompoops (in the name of Jesus Christ). If there is a hell,
its fires wait for them, not us.
Frank Zappa Meets the Mothers of Prevention, by Frank Zappa, (Barking Pumpkin
Records, 1985) (jacket cover) (emphasis in original).
Zappa also includes a quote of the first amendment, a quote from Senator Hollings,
the address to write to in order to receive a copy of the Senate Committee Hearing
report, a second address to receive information on the issue in general, and a plea to
register to vote. Id. The song "Porn Wars" is a direct response to the controversy. In
"Porn Wars,"
Zappa has woven statements made by [the Senate] officials at the Sept. 19
Senate Commerce Committee hearing ... into a provocative 12-minute track
.... The avant-garde "Porn Wars" is an ambitious collage that blends elec-
tronic music and statements actually made to the committee and to Zappa
.... The new track... begins with preliminary comments from Senators and
then seems to break away dramatically into a series of voices swirling, growl-
ing, chattering, chanting, and wailing.
Rense, Zappa Takes On the US. Senate in "Porn Wars", L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1985,
§ VI, at 1, col. 1. Apparently, a number of other selections were also named with the
PMRC specifically in mind. These include the tongue-in-cheek "Alien Orifice" and
"Aerobics in Bondage," both of which are entirely instrumental. The cassette also
bears a political cartoon which depicts a woman's hands feeding the Bill of Rights into
one end of a grinding machine. Party favors, horns, and notes fly out the other end.
An American flag and a view of the Senate office building are in the background.
Zappa is hardly the only one who feels strongly about the issue. U.S. News & World
Report, a normally sober, political news journal, began its coverage of the topic with:
"Day and night, America's youth are enticed by electronic visions of a world so violent,
sensual and narcotic that childhood itself appears to be under siege." Powell, supra
note 3, at 46.
Senator Hollings, a member of the Commerce Committee, has stated that " '[it's
outrageous filth, and we've got to do something about it .... If I could find some way
constitutionally to do away with it, I would.' He said he had asked the 'best constitu-
tional minds' around to see if the stuff could be legally outlawed." Zucchino, supra
note 1, at 65.
President Reagan has also commented: "I don't believe that our Founding Fathers
ever intended to create a nation where the rights of pornographers would take prece-
dence over the rights of parents, and the violent and malevolent would be given free
reign to prey upon our children." Powell, supra note 3, at 46.
Rolling Stone magazine has written an editorial on this issue:
Rating records for lyric content provides no benefit to the children it is meant
to protect and seriously threatens artists' freedom of expression and every-
which to address the rock lyric problem is to treat the material as ob-
scene. 22 If the lyrics are obscene, then they are not protected speech
within the ambit of the first amendment. 23 Thus, such lyrics would
be more susceptible to regulation.24 However, this approach raises
two important questions: first, whether the lyrics are obscene from a
constitutional standpoint; and second, even if the lyrics are obscene,
whether they can be constitutionally regulated.
The Supreme Court has grappled with defining obscenity in a vari-
one's freedom of choice. The Parents' Music Resource Center's proposal is
unworkable and unnecessary and comes perilously close to censorship.... [It]
is shortsighted, illogical, and dangerous.... As a vital and often raw form of
expression, rock tends to dance on the outer edge of what society finds accept-
able. It always has. We must make sure that it always does.
Rock Ratings: an unnecessary evil, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 7, 1985, at 10 (editorial).
21. Zucchino, supra note 1, at 9. See generally Record Labelling: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(Available by writing Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402; GPO Stock No. 052-070-06101-4.) [hereinafter Record Labelling].
22. The recording industry denies that an entire album - or even a song - can be
considered obscene merely because it contains words which are patently offensive.
The basic argument is that isolated groups of words do not completely obviate the ar-
tistic value of an album as a whole. See infra notes 34-67 and accompanying text.
The PMRC denies that it is seeking legislation based on the obscenity of the mate-
rial involved. It has reiterated consistently (even during an informal telephone re-
quest for information) that it seeks only to establish a voluntary means of regulation
similar to that used by the MPAA. For example, one spokesperson for the PMRC
stated ten times in a thirty-minute program that legislation was not being sought. See
Nightline, supra note 4. Arnold Fege of the National PTA has stated, "This is not a
censorship issue .... It's a consumer protection issue. It is absolutely not a censorship
issue." L.A. Daily J., Jan. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 1. The Chairman of the Senate Committee
opened the hearing by stating: "The reason for this hearing is not to promote any legis-
lation, indeed I don't know of any suggestion that any legislation be passed .. " John
Danforth, Statement Before the Senate Commerce Committee (Sept. 19, 1985).
However, not all agree with this position of non-censorship: "Senator Hollings began
the proceeding by noting 'It's outrageous filth.., and we've got to do something about
it .... ' He said that he had asked 'the best constitutional minds' around to see if the
stuff could be outlawed." Zucchino, supra note 1, at 65. "Senator James Exon (D-Ne-
braska)... said 'This is the largest media event I've ever seen .... If we're not talking
about federal regulation or legislation, Mr. Chairman, what's the reason for this hear-
ing?'" Id. Further legislation is sought by other groups. "The NCTV's Dr Radecki
notes accurately that the key to the PMRC's success so far has been 'the threat of leg-
islation.'" Washington Wives, supra note 16, at 18.
23. "We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852
(1957). In Roth, the defendant was convicted of violating the Federal Obscenity Stat-
ute by mailing obscene advertisements and an obscene book. In upholding Roth's con-
viction, the Court reaffirmed the validity of the statute as "a proper exercise of the
postal power delegated to Congress .... " Id. at 493.
24. However, because the interests that are protected are so important, the gov-
ernment must be careful in discerning which speech is actually obscene. Freedom of
speech enjoys a predominant status: "First Amendment rights are entitled to special
constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases
in which a state undertakes to regulate speech." Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp. 1328,
1331 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)) (emphasis
in Swope).
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ety of contexts for a number of years. The core definition is found in
Miller v. California.25 The permissible scope of state regulation of
obscenity is "limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the
prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value."26 The test for determining
whether the appeal is to a strictly prurient interest is whether it ap-
pears as such to "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards . ."27 Of singular significance, this appeal must be
the dominant theme of "the material taken as a whole .... "28
Albums, more so than books and films, are readily divisible into
easily identifiable components.29 Each album consists of several
songs, and each song normally has several lyrics. Rarely will an en-
tire album be permeated with the type of lyrics of which the PMRC
is concerned.30 In fact, most albums have only one or two lines
which are ostensibly obscene.
Therefore, the vast majority of commercial phonographs are un-
likely to be considered obscene, because they fail to pass this "domi-
nant theme" test. A single profane, or even blatantly pornographic
lyric will not be enough to establish the predominance of theme3l
which the Miller test requires.32 However, assuming this test is satis-
fied, there are still difficulties which make the obscenity theory an
25. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
26. Id. at 24.
27. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1973)). The Court is care-
ful to limit the definition to "prurient" depictions. Sex is not a per se aspect of obscen-
ity. Discussions and analysis of sex in various media--art, literature, textbooks-is to
be constitutionally protected. "Sex... is one of the vital problems of human interest
and public concern." Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
28. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
29. Censorship statutes are almost always designed as a response to films. Case
law addresses obscene magazines, books, photographs, films, and advertisements, but
only rarely centers on recordings. One exception to this is the recent controversy over
telephone pornography. See generally Cleary, Telephone Pornography: First Amend-
ment Constraints on Shielding Children from Dial-A-Porn, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 503
(1985).
30. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (the message "Fuck the Draft" which ap-
peared on the back of a jacket was ruled protected speech), rehg denied, 404 U.S. 876
(1971).
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
32. Perhaps the following describes a song with a predominant theme which ap-
peals to a prurient interest. "[Donna Summers 1970's hit] 'Love to Love You Baby,'
was a seventeen-minute vinyl aphrodisiac. It consisted of her repetitious moaning of
the title phrase over and over to the accompaniment of rapturous groans and murmurs
in a marathon of twenty-two orgasms." B. LARSON, ROCK: PRACTICAL HELP FOR
THOSE WHO LISTEN To THE WORDS AND DON'T LIKE WHAT THEY HEAR 17 (1980).
unlikely foundation upon which to base a possible plan for legislative
regulation.3 3
A. Constitutional Vagueness
In Freedman v. Maryland,34 the Supreme Court established a set
of requirements for censorship statutes.35 These guides are based
upon the cornerstone prior restraint rule.36 Essentially, this rule
states that any system which imposes a prior restraint on expression
"comes to [the] Court bearing a heavy presumption against its consti-
tutional validity."37 In light of this presumption, Freedman held that
any censorship process which requires the prior submission of a film
to a censor board must enact certain procedural safeguards if it is to
avoid "constitutional infirmity."38
The most significant of these requirements prohibits banning films
absent a judicial proceeding which affirms the censor board's initial
decision. The board must also bear the burden of initiating the pro-
ceedings, and maintaining the action once the hearing is granted.
Furthermore, these steps must be taken within a short, statutorily
fixed period. The board must act within this time, either by filing an
33. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
34. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
35. The case of Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), had already estab-
lished the rule that a state may not adopt procedures for dealing with obscenity with-
out considering the impact upon constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 731.
36. Prior restraint is the imposition of a burden upon a person before he speaks.
Normal censorship proceedings are initiated by the state. The state must also bear the
burden of proof in these proceedings. A system which requires submission of a film
prior to exhibition shifts these burdens to the artist. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60;
see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
Other dangers arise from the prior submission system. The censorship board is not a
judicial body. Because its primary function is censorship, not constitutional interpreta-
tion, it is less likely to be sensitive to first amendment freedoms. Also, if the censor-
ship process is unduly burdensome and causes unreasonable delay, the board's
determination can, in practice, be a final judgment, despite the fact that "[o]nly a judi-
cial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to free-
dom of expression ...." Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
37. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 70. Note that systems which impose prior restraints are
not invalid per se. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
38. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. In Freedman, no time limit was established in the
Maryland statute for board deliberations and deadlines for actions. Neither would the
board be required to initiate proceedings or maintain the burden of persuasion. The
exhibitor was merely notified that his film could not be shown. At his appeal, the
board would reexamine the film. Thereafter, appeals to the court system would be
"subject generally to the time and manner provided for taking appeal to the Court of
Appeals." Id. at 55 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 66a, § 19 (1957)).
In the only reported case of a complete appeal via the Maryland procedure, the first
judicial determination took four months; appellate review lasted an additional six
months. Id. at 56. See United Artists Corp. v. State Bd. of Censors, 210 Md. 586, 124
A.2d 292 (1956) (this was the single case, mentioned above, which went through the
procedure).
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action or by issuing a license to show the film.3 9
Freedman requires that the regulatory system provide for a
prompt, final judicial decision in order to "minimize the deterrent ef-
fect of an interim, and possibly erroneous, denial of a license."40 The
Court states specifically that "[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a
final judicial determination of the merits must similarly be limited to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compati-
ble with sound judicial resolution."41
State regulations also require government boards to explain license
denials,42 so that the reviewing court has a record of the criteria and
procedures employed by the board. Otherwise, the censor board is
answerable only to itself, and unless an appeal is requested, its deci-
sions are never scrutinized by an outside body. In other words,
"[v]ague standards, unless narrowed by interpretation, encourage er-
ratic administration whether the censor be administrative or judicial
".43
Legislation in this area can take one of two forms: license/permit44
39. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
40. Id. at 59.
41. Id. The apparent rationale for this is that, "[t]he Supreme Court has recently
found that the evils inherent in public exhibition of obscene films are sufficiently great
to justify prior administrative censorship of motion pictures." Universal Film Ex-
changes, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286, 290 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (citing Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961)).
42. See Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1967); ACLU v. City of Chicago,
13 Ill. App. 2d 278, 141 N.E.2d 56 (1957).
43. Interstate, 390 U.S. at 685. Interstate involved a film censorship statute which
classified films as either suitable or not suitable for persons under sixteen years of age.
The ordinance required a screening of any film if the censor board was "dissatisfied"
with its proposed classification. "Not suitable for young persons" was defined as:
(1) Describing or portraying brutality, criminal violence or depravity in such
a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite .. .young
persons; or
(2) Describing or portraying nudity... or sexual promiscuity or extra-mari-
tal or abnormal sexual relations in such a manner as to be, in the judgment of
the Board likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on
the part of young persons ....
A film shall be considered 'likely to incite or encourage' crime ... or sexual
promiscuity . . . if, in the judgment of the Board, there is a substantial
probability that it will create the impression on young persons that such con-
duct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or com-
monly accepted.
Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
44. A "license" is "[t]he permission by competent authority to do an act which,
without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort." BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 829 (5th ed. 1979). It is also "[a] permit, granted by an appropriate govern-
mental body, generally for a consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation to pursue
or penal.45 While penal codes normally operate by punishing persons
for actions which have already occurred,46 licensing regulations seek
to prevent the wrongdoing before it takes place. Although an obscen-
ity approach may have a deterrent effect by imposing a fine on the
defendant after exhibition or distribution of material deemed porno-
graphic,47 groups like the PMRC and the PTA, which aim, directly or
indirectly, to prevent music pornography from reaching children, es-
pecially favor prevention measures.48
The licensing system is based on compliance. If an exhibitor or art-
ist personally adheres to required procedures, and if his product is in
compliance, then a license will be issued authorizing the desired ac-
tivity. The permit system requires prior submission of the work to a
board which determines whether or not the work is in compliance.
Noncompliance can result in a ban on distribution.
Licensing presents inherent risks of prior restraint because it nec-
essarily compels pre-distribution submission. Thus, the most effec-
tive legislative option available is also the most constitutionally
tenuous, the least likely to withstand constitutional challenge in
court, and the most likely to infringe upon first amendment rights.
The great weakness of the licensing system is its propensity for con-
stitutional vagueness.49 Designing a censorship statute which avoids
vagueness has proven difficult, even in traditional areas.
Historically, movies, magazines, and books have been subject to
legislation. 50 Music, however, presents difficulties unique to its me-
dium. Because sound is far more abstract than the written word, in-
nuendo and ambiguity are far more prevalent. Clarity, or lack
thereof, also assumes greater importance; how does one address a
lyric which is explicit when written, but incomprehensible when per-
formed?51 This is especially common among heavy metal genres -
some occupation or to carry on some business subject to regulation under the police
power." Id.
45. "Penal" means, "punishable; inflicting a punishment; containing a penalty, or
relating to a penalty." Id. at 1019.
46. I&
47. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 1-22 and accompanying text.
49. A significant second weakness is the unpopularity of the censorship issue. Pol-
iticians may not support censorship because it is commonly associated with totalitari-
anism rather than maintenance of community standards.
A third weakness is the unlikelihood that a federal statute will be passed. Action is
far more probable at the state or local level.
50. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Coates v. City of Cincin-
nati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
51. A further extension of this problem, and a concern of the PMRC, involves
backward masking. Albums with backward masking contain recorded information
which can be heard only when the album is rotated backwards. Many of these
messages contain references to Satan and the occult. Others are less objectionable.
Legislation has been proposed at both the state and federal levels. See generally Little
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fields particularly targeted by the PMRC, the PTA and other groups.
Legislative difficulties are exemplified in Freedman. The statute
in Freedman was obviously vague, partially because the censor board
had extremely broad power over film distribution, and partially be-
cause the board had no obligation to divulge the bases of its judg-
ments.52 In Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. City of Chicago,53
the court stated that any censorship statute "must be approached
with a caution dictated by the fact that it is a patent invasion of the
right to freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment." 4
The statute in Paramount granted licenses freely, even to legally
obscene movies, so long as the audience was restricted to persons
over twenty-one years of age. In effect, the legislature defined "ob-
scene" in terms of age. The court described this anomaly as "an evi-
dent contradiction in sense .... A picture is either 'obscene'. . . or it
is not .... [A] picture either does or does not 'portray lack of virtue
of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion.' None of
these criteria can change with the age of the beholder .... 5
At the Supreme Court level, only one censorship statute has sur-
vived a challenge for vagueness. 56 In that case, the plaintiffs con-
tended "that the standard 'obscene when viewed by children' [was] so
vague that the censors [were] vested with unfettered discretion to
deny permits."57 Unexpectedly, the court upheld the statute. In do-
ing so, it cited Ginsberg v. New York, 58 which held that the phrase
"harmful to minors" was not unconstitutionally vague, essentially be-
cause the magazines in question were harmful to minors, "although
not obscene for adult readers." 59
The Universal holding, however, had one qualification. Its facts
were clearly distinguishable from those in Ginsberg, and the court
noted this. The definition of "obscene when viewed by children," did
not encompass "near obscene" films. It dealt strictly with those films
that were clearly pornographic. Consequently, the holding in Univer-
Feet, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1982, at D1, col. 4; Bliss, Subliminal Projection History and
Analysis, 5 COMMENT 419 (1983).
52. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); see supra notes 34-38 and accompa-
nying text.
53. 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
54. Id. at 70.
55. Id. at 71.
56. Universal Film Exch., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
57. Id. at 293.
58. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
59. Universal, 288 F. Supp. at 294.
sal can be applied only to those situations in which there is no serious
doubt as to content. The decision failed to address what would hap-
pen when a "near obscene" film was subject to censorship. The Uni-
versal statute, as a model, is vague only when applied to material
which is not clearly pornographic.60
The foregoing discussion highlights a primary concern in designing
a statute to address the record label issue. Vagueness is the primary
hurdle which must be cleared. However, Universal demonstrates
that even criteria based on age can be construed as constitutionally
acceptable. Still, such a statute must be sufficiently detailed to avoid
the potential problems posed in Universal.
B. The MPAA Alternative
Translation of the MPAA standards61 from film to music is not a
workable alternative, if only because those standards have not yet
been approved as adequate film classifications. The rating system
used by the MPAA for films produced by its member companies is a
strictly voluntary, non-legislative, and unofficial procedure. Court
decisions indicate that the system is not acceptable in codified form.
Attempts to codify the MPAA classification system began as early
as 1970, almost immediately after the standards were created. In
MPAA, Inc. v. Specter,6 2 a criminal statute copied the MPAA system,
but was summarily ruled unconstitutional for vagueness:
The evidence clearly established that the code and rating administration of
the Association has itself no defined standards or criteria against which to
measure its ratings. Twelve persons, four in New York and eight on the Pa-
60. Any statute designed to establish a permit system would surely need to meet
the minimal standards of the statute in Universal, which required a permit "for the
exhibition of any motion picture in a public place in the city, to an audience which in-
cludes any person under 18 years of age." Id. at 288. It provided for examination by
the superintendent of police or the Film Review Section (a six member board, also cre-
ated by the ordinance) within two days of receipt of the permit application. Id. The
permit had to be either issued or denied "forthwith" upon inspection of the film. If
the permit was rejected by the Film Review Section, then it would be reviewed within
seven days by the Motion Picture Appeal Board.
The Appeal Board was required to "review the film in its entirety, and... consider
whatever evidence the exhibitor or distributor... wish[ed] to present in support of the
exhibition of the film." Id. at 289. A ruling had to be announced within three days of
the viewing. If the permit was still denied, the government would file an action within
three days in the Circuit Court of Cook County. A further provision of the law was
that whenever the City of Chicago failed to meet the demands of the statute, the mo-
tion picture could be exhibited without permit or fees, and without violating the stat-
ute. Id.
61. For a basic description of the standards see supra note 7 and accompanying
text. See also Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (detailed
history of how the MPAA voluntary rating system originated, including a summary of
the purpose of rating, how ratings are determined, and what they mean objectively).
See also M. MAYER, THE FILM INDUSTRIES (1978) (analysis of the politics behind the
rating system and alternatives to it).
62. 315 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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cific coast, do the rating, a voluntary Association undertaking. Films viewed
are simply graded accordingly to the individual reactions of the viewing
members.
6 3
In light of this informal rating system, the court found the act "so pa-
tently vague and lacking in any ascertainable standards and so infr-
ing[ing] upon the plaintiffs' rights to freedom of expression... as to
render it unconstitutional."64
A similar statute, in National Ass'n of Theater Owners of Wiscon-
sin v. Motion Picture Commission of the City of Milwaukee,65
granted authority to a local rating commission. 66 This had the effect
of legally mandating what would otherwise be a voluntary determi-
nation. Furthermore, the Commission could initiate actions to en-
force its decisions. Another provision required that classifications
"be carried in all newspaper advertising in type of bold face and at
least 25% of the size of the film title . . .[and] be announced in all
radio and television advertising."67 The court found the statute un-
constitutionally vague "because the ordinance on its face effectively
chills the exercise of First Amendment rights."68
63. Id. at 825. See also Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968), in
which the Supreme Court warns against overbroad laws which permit unbridled cen-
sorship. The Court ruled the term in the statute "sexual promiscuity" to not be a suf-
ficiently definite standard. Id. at 687-88.
64. Specter, 315 F. Supp. at 826. A further difficulty with the adaptation is that
such a statute subjects only those whose films are rated by the Association to possible
criminal sanctions. Exhibitors who simply do not show rated films, effectively avoid
the law. Technically, they cannot violate the law. Id.
65. 328 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
66. The Commission was:
originally formed pursuant to Common Council Resolution, File No. 12428
(Feb. 26, 1917), for the purpose of providing advice with respect to motion pic-
ture films exhibited in Milwaukee. Prior to October 12, 1970, there was no
resolution, ordinance, regulation, rule, or other written law defining or
describing any standards or classification or process for classification of mo-
tion picture films .... Nevertheless.. . the Commission, pursuant to its un-
derstanding of the original funding resolution, has . . . classified motion
picture films to be exhibited in Milwaukee.
On October 19, 1970, the Commission was empowered . . . to classify and
censor motion picture films ....
Id. at 9-10.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id. at 11. The court also based its holding on procedural failings of the statute.
Specifically, the statute failed to provide for a prompt, final judicial review. Id. at 12.
In a third case, Engdahl v. City of Kenosha, 317 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Wis. 1970), the
Commission sought to partially incorporate MPAA standards. Here, the Commission
attempted to use the term "adult motion picture" as defined by the MPAA. The court
held that the ordinance constituted a prior restraint on the exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms. It further stipulated that a "classification system" could work a prior
C. Constitutional Overbreadth
Although the Supreme Court has not always clearly distinguished
"vagueness" from "overbreadth,"69 it has offered various definitions
for both terms. The commonly accepted definition of "overbreadth"
is stated in rule form: "'[A] governmental purpose to control or pre-
vent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.' "70 In other words, a law en-
acted to achieve a constitutionally legitimate end must not exceed its
defined scope. Such prohibited excess occurs whenever the regula-
tions impinge upon another right, or another class of persons.
In this context, the issue is whether a regulation designed princi-
pally to protect children,71 is overly broad because it affects adults.
In 1956, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute which
prohibited persons from distributing books to the public which a trial
judge "found to have a potentially deleterious influence upon
youth."72 The Supreme Court found that "[tihe incidence of this en-
actment is to reduce the adult population.., to reading only what is
fit for children." 73
If the overbreadth hurdle is cleared, courts will likely be more re-
ceptive to regulations proposed especially for children's protection.74
Technically, this should not be so. Obscenity with respect to minors
"is defined by adopting the three parts of the adult obscenity defini-
tion-prurient effect, patent offensiveness, and no value-to a hypo-
thetical audience of minors."75 Yet, the Court has often supported
arguments which advocate a uniformly lowered threshold for defin-
ing the patently obscene.76
restraint just as could a "censorship system." "A prior restraint on First Amendment
rights does not have to be total to be impermissable." Id. at 1135.
69. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (statute held unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad).
70. Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377
U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
71. See supra notes 1-21 and accompanying text.
72. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1956) (appellant sold an obscene book to
a police officer, not a youth; book was determined to have potential effect on youths).
73. Id. In this case, Justice Frankfurter described the statute in question as analo-
gous to burning down a house in order to roast a pig. A revised version of the apo-
thegm states that "the PMRC's demands are the equivalent of treating dandruff by
decapitation." Record Labelling, supra note 20 (statement of Frank Zappa).
74. The age line ... must to some extent be arbitrary. Although an upper
limit of... 17 would appear justified in terms of precedents such as drivers'
licenses, compulsory education and selective service, the lower the age, the
less the restriction on free speech and the stronger the argument for the con-
stitutionality of a classification system.
Comment, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship
by Age Classification, 69 YALE L.J. 141, 144 n.23 (1959).
75. Cleary, supra note 29, at 523 (footnotes omitted).
76. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography industry); FCC v.
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In Federal Communications v. Pacifica Foundation,77 a New York
radio station played a twelve-minute comedy monologue by George
Carlin, popularly known as "The Seven Filthy Words."78 The broad-
cast occurred at about two o'clock in the afternoon on a weekday,
thus reaching a very large-and very broadly based-audience. The
FCC's argument was based principally upon the nature of the mate-
rial broadcast. It argued, inter alia, that broadcasting requires spe-
cial treatment because "children have access to radios and in many
cases are unsupervised by parents . . ."79 (Interestingly, this word-
ing is practically identical to that used by the PMRC.)
The Court prefaced its opinion by acknowledging that offensive
speech is not obscene, and cannot normally be regulated as such. The
Court then described a lesser standard, designed specifically to ad-
dress broadcast information. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion,
upheld the ruling of the FCC. He stated that "the speech from which
society may attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which
appeals to the youthful prurient interest. The language involved in
this case is as potentially degrading and harmful to children as repre-
sentations of many erotic acts."80 Justice Powell stated that, in ef-
fect, this sort of distribution "[could] be limited, though not
prohibited," thus requiring sellers to close their doors only to
children.81
Under the Pacjfca ruling, material which is merely profane, not
obscene, can be regulated in contexts where children might have ac-
cess to it.82 This new standard grants to the states a broad regulatory
power wherever circumstances directly involve children. "[Tihe
Court has maintained a disparity between materials that can be regu-
lated as to children and materials that can be regulated as to
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (radio broadcast industry); Comment, supra note
73, at 141 (telephone broadcast industry).
77. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
78. 1i A copy of the monologue is appended to the opinion in Pacif/ca.
79. Id. at 731 n.2. The Pacifica Foundation responded by explaining that the mon-
ologue was played as part of a program about society's attitude toward language and
that "listeners had been advised that it included 'sensitive language which might be
regarded as offensive to some ... ' " Id. at 730.
80. Id. at 758 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. The rule has been aptly stated by Mr. Cleary: "'(I]ndecent' materials such as
those at issue in Pacific are subject to state regulations. The concept of 'indecency'
applied in Pacifwa measures only the offensiveness of materials without requiring a
prurient effect . .. for Justice Stevens, indecent words 'offend for the same reasons
that obscenity offends.'" Cleary, supra note 29, at 524.
adults."83
At first glance, the lower standard seems directly applicable to the
record labeling situation because child access and exposure are evi-
dent. This standard would benefit the PMRC because the profanity
level of review circumvents, to a great degree, the difficulties en-
tailed in defining and qualifying given lyrics as constitutionally ob-
scene.8 4 The "profanity" level of review has also been applied to
telephone pornography.8 5 Telephone messages are as difficult to
monitor as radio broadcasts. For this reason, it is virtually impossible
to separate audiences into adult and child. The level of review, there-
fore, becomes essential to regulating an otherwise unreachable
area.
8 6
The key distinction between phonograph and radio disseminations
is that phonographs are not necessarily broadcast over public radio
waves. The PMRC has evidenced an interest in broadcast material,
but its primary focus remains on the retail sale of the records them-
selves. Children are currently barred from adult bookstores and the-
aters. Presumably, their access to certain record stores or to specific
areas within such stores can also be restricted.
IV. THE INCITEMENT APPROACH: IF ROCK LYRICS CONSTITUTE
INCITEMENT, THEY ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY UNPROTECTED
AND CAN BE REGULATED ACCORDINGLY
Civil liability actions have sought to restrict indirectly certain dan-
gerous types of expression by imposing liability through the constitu-
tional doctrine of incitement. Basically, these cases allege that the
media in question caused, or "incited," the injurious activity. Simi-
larly, a statute imposing civil liability for lyrics which cause incite-
83. Id. at 524.
84. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
85. See generally Cleary, supra note 29. The Federal Communications Authoriza-
tions Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-214, § 8(a), 1983 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1 (97
Stat.) 1467, 1469-70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 2237) makes transmission of sexually
oriented messages to minors a federal crime. Cleary, supra note 29, at 504. Telephone
pornography is a recorded information service persons can call to hear various sexual
messages and simulations. The business is lucrative:
The dial-a-porn service in New York City received 800,000 calls daily in May
1983 and 180,000,000 calls in the year ending February 1984. At the tariff rate
of two cents per call, these calls generated revenues for the dial-a-porn spon-
sor of $16,000.00 per day and $3,600,000 per year.
Id. at 505-06 (notes omitted).
86. Child pornography statutes are also reviewed under an "indecent" standard
for regulation. This is because the Miller definition does not adequately represent the
state's especially compelling interest in "prosecuting those who promote the sexual ex-
ploitation of children. Thus, the question . . .of whether a work . . .appeals to the
prurient interest of the average person bears [no] connection to the issue .... New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
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ment could be drafted.87
The incitement theory is attractive because, like obscenity, such
speech is not constitutionally protected.88 Thus, it is more vulnerable
to civil and criminal attack. The Supreme Court has defined incite-
ment as speech which "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."8 9
There are two difficulties with this approach. First, antisocial be-
havior has not been conclusively traced to the media.90 A general an-
tipornography statute based on incitement has been advocated by
groups which assert that pornography promotes a variety of illegal
acts against women.9 1 These include "physical, psychological, and
87. Actually, some censorship statutes, indirectly founded upon the incitement
theory, use incitement to define obscenity. See Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S.
676, 681 (1968) (statute defined violent and sexual themes as not suitable for young
persons if they are "likely to incite ... delinquency or sexual promiscuity ....") (em-
phasis added).
88. For a general development of this doctrine since the 1940's, when it was used
primarily as a means for prosecuting communists, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); and Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
For the early development of incitement, when it was used against socialists and an-
archists who advocated the violent overthrow of government, see DeJonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
89. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
90. See Elias, Sex Publications and Moral Corruption: The Supreme Court Di-
lemma, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 302 (1967): "Speech must be related to conduct or ac-
tion before it may be constitutionally penalized or suppressed. There is no evidence
that obscene publications have any affect on conduct beyond perhaps arousing impure
thoughts." Id. at 314 (footnotes omitted). See generally HEALY & BRONNER, NEW
LIGHT ON DELINQUENCY AND ITS TREATMENT 72 (1936); MITCHELL, CHILDREN AND THE
MovIEs 142 (1934). But cf. Comment, supra note 73, at 147 (evidence appears more
convincing that motion pictures may cause objectionable behavior in children than in
adults).
The Federal Trade Commission has conducted an investigation into the effects tele-
vision advertising may have on children. The investigation ended without promulgat-
ing any legislation. Heinke, Is The Media Liable for Television Violence?, L.A. Daily
J., Dec. 16, 1981, at 4, col. 4.
The National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is author-
ized to investigate potential links between media violence and actual violence, sexual
abuse, and exploitation. 42 U.S.C. § 5653 (Supp. II 1984).
91. One such group is Women Against Violence in Pornography and Media
(WAVPM). See generally Hommel, Images of Women in Pornography and Media, 8
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 207 (1979). This article is basically a reprinting of a
slide show and lecture on how women are popularly presented as victims, objects, and
as inferior to men. For example:
This is the cover of a record album called Wild Angel, by Nelson Slater. The
woman's face is like a mannequin - smooth and almost plastic looking. The
posture with head back, throat exposed, is a common motif. It says, 'I'm vul-
economic coercion of women into performing pornographic acts in
front of cameras, attacks on women by strangers, and physical coer-
cion by husbands or lovers who want to reenact scenes from porno-
graphic films or magazines." 92 These assertions, however, have not
been proven.
Second, incitement, as a constitutional theory, is not readily appli-
cable to obscenity. The incitement doctrine originated as a response
to the criminal syndicalism acts of the 1930's and the 1950's. These
laws sought to restrict political speech advocating criminal conduct,
overthrow of the government, or the use of violent means for any
political end. Broad application of these acts began to threaten free
speech when individuals were persecuted for mere membership in or-
ganizations, or even for believing in certain political theories.93
The Supreme Court responded to these extremes by allowing state
authority to address only that speech which advocated illegal activity,
and which was also likely to cause such activity to occur. "'[T]he
mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral ne-
cessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing
a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.' "94 Political
debate and belief fall well outside the state's authority in this area.
In DeFilippo v. NBC,95 a young boy hung himself while attempting
to reenact a stunt shown on The Johnny Carson Show. The plaintiffs
claimed that their son regularly watched the show, and that defend-
ants were negligent in permitting it to be aired. "[A]n amended com-
plaint ... rais[ed] four causes of action: negligence; failure to warn;
and two novel theories - products liability and intentional tort tres-
pass." 96 The Court never addressed these theories of liability, hold-
ing only that the first amendment barred recovery. With regard to
incitement, the court stated that "[t]he main problem in permitting
relief to the DeFilippos is that incitement cannot be measured pre-
cisely. Nicky was ... the only person who is alleged to have emulated
the action portrayed. . ... 97
nerable, I'm an easy target.' You will never see John Wayne or President
Carter in a position like that. The chain through the woman's mouth resem-
bles a bit used to break horses, suggesting that women are wild beasts that
need to be broken. Every detail of the graphic design is evocative. The blood
red background denotes violence, passion, intense pain. The white streaks of
light in the background resemble knife blades.
Id. at 209. The presentation addresses many such images, many more graphic than
this.
92. Comment, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 460, 463-64 (1984) (footnote omitted).
93. See supra notes 86-87.
94. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (quoting Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
95. 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1872 (R.I. 1982).
96. Id. at 1873.
97. Id. at 1876. The court issued the caveat that the incitement standard is to be
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Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon 98 involved a plaintiff
who copied a stunt performed on The Mickey Mouse Club Show. The
stunt required placing a BB pellet inside a balloon, blowing up the
balloon, and then rotating the pellet. The apparent objective of this
endeavor was to accurately simulate the sound of a tire tearing away
from an automobile. The plaintiff substituted a large piece of lead
for the BB pellet; this caused the balloon to pop, thereby impelling
the lead into the plaintiff's eye. The plaintiff's theory of liability was
no less imaginative than that in DeFilippo, alleging that the program
constituted an invitation, to do something which posed a foreseeable
risk of injury to a child; the plaintiff accepted the invitation.99 The
court rejected this argument because one of the two elements neces-
sary to maintain the action was lacking.100 However, the court held
that incitement was the appropriate theory of liability, but stated
that the facts did not comply with the Schenklol formulation because
the statements failed to "give rise to a clear and present danger of
personal injury to the plaintiff."102
The only two federal cases addressing this issue ruled that the in-
applied cautiously "since the criteria underlying its application are vague. [Flurther,
[sic] allowing recovery under such an exception would inevitably lead to self-censor-
ship on the part of broadcasters .... Id.
98. 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
99. Id. at 403, 276 S.E.2d at 581.
100. The only precedent the court found for such a cause of action was in the "pied
piper" line of cases:
As we read the pied piper cases, they contain two basic elements: (1) there
must be an express or implied invitation extended to the child to do some-
thing posing a foreseeable risk of injury; and (2) the defendant must be
chargeable with maintaining or providing the child with the instrumentality
causing the injury. In this case, the first element is arguably present, but the
second element is undisputably absent.
Id. at 405, 276 S.E.2d at 582-83.
101. The court paraphrased the Schenk formulation as follows:
An utterance can be suppressed or penalized on the ground that it tends to
incite an immediate breach of peace, if "the words are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent."
Id. at 404, 276 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
102. Id. A California case, Olivia N. v. NBC, 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1977), involved a rape by instrumentality. It was alleged that three juveniles raped
plaintiff in a manner factually similar to a scene in the television drama Born Inno-
cent, and that they "were acting upon the stimulus of observing a scene of brutality
which had been broadcast .... ." Id. at 386, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The substance of the
appeal was dismissed, since the appellant had been wrongfully denied a jury trial.
However, the court discussed the incitement issue and determined that it would be a
question of fact for the jury.
citement theory was inappropriate. 103 In Zamora v. Columbia Broad-
casting System,104 the court projected the possible consequences of an
affirmative ruling. It found that recognition of incitement as a cause
of action in this situation would provide no clear standard for the tel-
evision industry to follow. The networks would be required to antici-
pate every remotely possible act of violence-regardless of the
criminal intent of the actor.105
Similarly, regarding the phonograph medium, a suit was recently
brought against singer Ozzie Osbourne, alleging that Mr. Osbourne's
music contributed to a teenager's suicide. The decedent allegedly
"shot himself with a .22 caliber pistol after brooding for several hours
.... He had been listening to the Osbourne composition [Suicide So-
lution] on a pair of earphones that were still on his head after his
body was discovered."106
Three problems arise in applying the incitement approach to regu-
lation of rock lyrics; (1) rarely is the speaker/singer expressly advo-
cating that lyrics be interpreted as reality; (2) such lyrics do not pose
"imminent" danger in the Brandenburg sense; and (3) causation is
rarely, if ever, evident.
The record labeling context is too far removed from that in which
the incitement doctrine evolved. Language which allegedly incites
children to become sexually active, or to perform obscene or even vi-
103. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Zamora v. CBS,
480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979). In Zamora, plaintiff had killed an 83-year-old woman
and sued CBS, ABC, and NBC on the grounds that he had become "involuntarily ad-
dicted to and 'completely subliminally intoxicated' by extensive viewing of television
violence." Id. at 200.
In Herceg, plaintiff's brother and son hung themselves attempting to recreate the so-
called "Orgasm of Death" detailed in an article by that name in Hustler Magazine.
Plaintiff sued on grounds of negligent publication as well as a strict liability theory.
Incitement was the prong in the negligent publication theory upon which the duty of
the publisher was alleged. The court rejected the incitement argument, stating, " 'Neg-
ligent' publication is a cause of action which arose in defamation cases. No court has
held that the written word is either an attractive nuisance ... or a dangerous instru-
mentality .... " Herceg, 565 F. Supp. at 803.
Cases which hold that published ideas are not products properly subject to a prod-
ucts liability suit include: Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc. 2d 189, 438 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (experiment in textbook); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (recipe in a cookbook).
In Carter v. Rand McNally, No. 76-1864-F (D. Mass. 1976) (unreported case cited in
Swartz, "You Can't Judge a Book By Its Cover," TRIAL, Nov. 1981, at 110), plaintiff
brought a successful suit of negligence. A student was injured by methylalcohol va-
pors which exploded. Use of alcohol was recommended and suggested by the publica-
tion without warnings. The case was settled for $1.1 million.
104. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
105. Id. at 206.
106. McDougal, Osbourne Denounces Suit in Teenager's Suicide, L.A. Times, Jan.
22, 1986, § 6, at 5, col. 1. See also Goldstein, Pop Eye: Is Heavy Metal a Loaded Gun
Aimed at Its Fans?, L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1986 (Calendar) at 68, col. 3.
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olent acts, does not present the same dangers, or mandate the same
level of state interest as incitement to political overthrow.
V. REGULATIONS UNDER STATE POLICE POWER: IS THE STATE
INTEREST IN SUPERVISING AND PROTECTING ITS CHILDREN
PARAMOUNT TO THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE
INFORMATION?
The PMRC has intimated that it may seek to implement a state
level plan. Such a plan could be soundly based on the states' recog-
nized interest in the supervision and protection of its children. Par-
ents, too, have a constitutionally recognized right to supervise the
education of their children.
These interests were recognized as early as 1923. In Meyer v. Ne-
braska,o7 a parochial school instructor was tried and convicted for vi-
olating a Nebraska state law which forbade teaching any subject in a
modern language other than English. Foreign languages could be
taught as separate subjects only to students having passed the eighth
grade. The purpose of the law was to cause children of immigrants to
adopt English as their native tongue. The instructor had taught read-
ing in German to a child who had not yet passed the eighth grade.108
The Court held the statute unconstitutional, acknowledging the
parent's right of control "to give his children education suitable to
their station in life .... "109 However, the Court did recognize and
stress that the state police power entailed authority to supervise the
education of its minor citizens.110 Essentially, a state has the power
to:
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers
and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that
teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that cer-
tain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.1 1 1
This power extends beyond the classroom. The state is within its
authority when it regulates, for example, child employment. To
some extent, even parental control is secondary to the authority of
107. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
108. Id. at 396-97. The statute, enacted in 1919, did not target the German language.
109. Id. at 400.
110. "That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the
quality of its citizens .. .is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected." Id. at 401.
111. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
the state' 1 2 because the state can act to guard the general well-being
of its youth. "[Tihe state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the
child's labor, and in many other ways." 3
The PMRC, the RIAA, and other concerned parties are particu-
larly interested in the state's supervisory power to regulate pornogra-
phy, in addition to education, employment, and physical protection.
In Ginsberg v. New York," i 4 the state prohibited sales of porno-
graphic and near pornographicll5 materials to minors. The Court
found the law to be a proper exercise of the state's interest in the
well-being of its youth.
In light of these decisions, three conclusions can be drawn regard-
ing a state's power to supervise children: (1) protection and education
of children are state, not federal, concerns; (2) a state can guard chil-
dren against physical, psychological, and emotional injury; and
(3) while parental interests are paramount,"16 the state's power to
regulate reaches even to the nuclear family. However, this power is
not all-encompassing, nor is it applicable to every aspect of a child's
life. On the contrary, every point at which the supervisory powers
are refined is met by a parallel-even counter---argument for the
right of a child to receive information, to "access" knowledge, and to
learn.
In Meyer, the state's power "to improve the quality of its citizens
. . .,"117 is subordinated to the "opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge .. ."118 The holding in Pierce, that states can regulate
the education. of children, is limited by the fact that the state cannot
standardize its children "by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only.""i 9
Two sub-issues arise out of this antithesis: First, whether listening
to music qualifies as a constitutional access of knowledge; and second,
whether music is a field which the state can legitimately supervise.
112. "IT]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest...." Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (plaintiff was barred from selling/distribut-
ing religious pamphlets on basis of state regulation, in spite of freedom of religion
claim).
113. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted).
114. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
115. The materials sold in Ginsberg would not have been obscene by adult stan-
dards. Id. at 634.
116. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obli-
gations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
117. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
118. Id.
119. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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A. Whether Music is "Information"
The right to access information has been applied to a wide range of
situations,120 such as information broadcast over radio and television
waves. 12 1 There is equally a right to receive foreign political informa-
tion without federal intervention. 122 Prisoners have the right to re-
ceive uncensored mail.123 The politician's right to canvass is derived
from his constituents' right to be informed,124 just as a newspaper re-
porter's right to access trials is founded upon his reader's right to re-
ceive information.125 Commercial enterprises may advertise their
views on political and social issues partly because their customers,
and the public in general, have a right to such information.126
120. The right to access knowledge is not based on the value of that knowledge.
See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right extends to acquisition of obscene
material). In Stanley, appellant was arrested for possession of obscene matter. The
state court held that the charge of possession alone was sufficient; the defendant need
not have planned to sell, expose, or circulate the material. Appellant asserted the
right to read what he chose, or as the Court put it, "[h]e is asserting the right to be
free from state inquiry into the contents of his library .. " Id. at 565. The Court held
that the right to receive information is fundamental to a free society, and that it is ir-
relevant "that obscene materials in general, are arguably devoid of any ideological con-
tent. The line between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too
elusive for this Court to draw .... " Id. at 566. However, such an uninhibited right of
access is granted only to adults, not children.
121. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that "the
people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right
to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First
Amendment").
122. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (where a federal provi-
sion requiring the Post Office to hold foreign mail consisting of communist political
propaganda until the addressee requested delivery was an unlawful inhibition on the
free flow of ideas). But see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Belgium jour-
nalist denied visa to the United States to lecture on communism because on a prior
visit he had acted outside of the permitted purpose of the visit).
123. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
124. Hynes v. Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
125. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). But see Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (where newsmen were unable to compel state to per-
mit access to prison inmates and jail facility for purpose of photographing and inter-
viewing); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (although there is a right to receive
information, first amendment does not allow a newsman to keep sources confidential
when questioned by a grand jury).
126. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530 (1980) (utility company permitted to include information on political and so-
cial issues in billing inserts because of customers' right to receive information); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (corporations permitted to adver-
tise views on political subjects which materially affect their business or property, as
long as the speaker is identified); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748 (1975) (pharmacies allowed to advertise prescription drug prices be-
cause of the right of consumers to be informed as to the value of the product).
The right to access information "is a necessary predicate to the re-
cipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and
political freedom .... ,,127 Given this reasoning and the applications
above, it seems evident that music must also be constitutionally ac-
cessible. Music, like any news report, any scholastic text, or any
political treatise, is merely one medium among many in which infor-
mation is transmitted. At a higher level, music is art; it embodies and
delivers ideas, philosophies, and emotions. Thus, it is not logical to
limit access to music without imposing similar limits on the various
other modes of communication.
B. Music and the State Power of Supervision
In most situations, the right to receive information takes prece-
dence over state authority to supervise education.128 Even in formal
public education, states have limited power to regulate. The state can
design public school curricula, but it cannot prohibit instructors from
teaching Darwin's theory of evolution.129 School boards may control
library content, but may not remove texts indiscriminately. 130 While
public universities can deny funds for student newspapers, they can-
not arbitrarily censor those which are funded.131 Finally, although
local boards of education fund subscriptions to periodicals they
choose, they cannot cancel those subscriptions when magazines are
found to contain advertisements for contraceptives and pro-commu-
nist newspapers. 132 Thus, not only is the state's supervisory power
limited to the education field, it is also carefully monitored even in
that area.
The most significant case in this area is Board of Education v.
Pico. 3 3 In this case, the plaintiffs sued to enjoin a local school board
from removing selected books from the school library. The plurality
decision concluded that the removal was unconstitutional because it
was motivated by the personal, political, and social beliefs of the
school board. However, the Court warned that "[t]his would be a
very different case if the record demonstrated that petitioners had
127. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (emphasis in original).
128. There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974) (prisoners' right to receive information not greater than the safety interest in
opening packages prior to delivery); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (inter-
est in excluding undesirable aliens is more compelling than the right of students to
hear a foreign lecturer); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(prohibition of publication of government classified information).
129. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
130. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Right to Read Defense Comm. v.
School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
131. ACLU of Virginia v. Redford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970).
132. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D. N.H. 1979).
133. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
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employed established, regular, and facially unbiased procedures for
the review of controversial materials."134
It is significant that this case involved library books rather than
textbooks. Because students are required to read texts which are
part of a curriculum, a school board generally retains stricter control
over selection of texts, than over selection of library content. Fur-
thermore, the Court addressed only removal of books from libraries,
thus avoiding the question of initial selection and reordering.
Despite its dicta,'3 5 the Court's approach to this area of the law is
still uncertain and unpredictable. Among the many varied opinions
of the Court is a plurality opinion full of caveats and qualifications,
two concurrences, and four dissents. The plurality opinion was writ-
ten by Justice Brennan, and joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens,
and Blackmun.136 It was met by a vigorous dissent written by Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor.
The Chief Justice essentially argued that the states' supervisory pow-
ers are exclusive: "I categorically reject this notion that the Constitu-
tion dictates that judges, rather than parents, teachers, and local
school boards, must determine how the standards of morality and
vulgarity are to be treated in the classroom."137 He further argued
that, should the plurality decision become law, the federal court sys-
tem would be forced to act as a super censor.138 Finally, he pointed
out that the state was not required to promote affirmatively the right
to receive information, but was required only to "protect" this
right.139
Regulation, classification, or censorship of popular music cannot be
based upon the state interest in supervising and promoting the
morals and welfare of its minor citizens. This interest is principally
fulfilled through formal, public education. It is a limited, but impor-
tant, arena of state influence. Even in the public school context, the
supervisory power of the state is not unfettered by the child's first-
amendment right to receive information.
134. Id. at 874.
135. "[T]he States and local school boards in matters of education must be exer-
cised in a manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the first amend-
ment." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982).
136. Blackmun joined the opinion only in part.
137. Pico, 457 U.S. at 893 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 888 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
C. Time, Place, or Manner Regulation
The state may control speech which takes place in a public forum
by regulating the time, place, or manner in which the activity is con-
ducted. For such limited restrictions to be valid, they must be rea-
sonable and implemented without regard to the content of the
speech. These limits on the power of the state exist to prevent re-
strictions of content being disguised as regulations on the manner in
which the speech is made.140 The United States Supreme Court has
held that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
1 4 1
This rule has been developed into a three-step analysis under which
time, place, or manner restrictions will be upheld so long as they are
1) content neutral; 2) narrowly defined to address a significant gov-
ernmental interest; and 3) leave open ample alternative means of
communication. 142
In applying this to test the validity of a state regulation, there are
two analytical steps. Initially, it must be determined if the regulation
of the manner of speech is actually an attempt to control or suppress
the content of the message. Such a regulation will not be upheld un-
less the reviewing court determines that content falls within a cate-
gory of speech which is unprotected by the first amendment.4 3
Assuming that the regulation is not designed to restrict content, it
must then be determined if the regulation is the least restrictive
means of promoting a significant governmental interest. This is a
balancing test which weighs the stringency of the time, place, or
manner regulation against the significance of the state interest in-
volved. However, leaving open an alternative means for communica-
tion of the speech weighs heavily in deciding the permissibility of the
regulation.144
Two methods can be suggested in which recorded music can be reg-
ulated through time, place, or manner restrictions. First, the place
recorded music is delivered can be controlled, if indeed the delivery
takes place in a public forum. Second, the state can regulate certain
140. See Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167, 176 (1976); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
92-94 (1977).
141. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
142. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
143. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984). See also supra notes 22-33
and 87-89 and accompanying text.
144. Regan, 468 U.S. at 648.
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music in order to protect classes of individuals who claim a right to
avoid hearing the message.
1. Regulation based upon the type of forum
The Supreme Court has recognized that there are at least three
types of public forums. Each type can be subject to varying degrees
of state control because of the nature of the forum.
The government is most restricted in the regulations it can impose
in places which have traditionally been used for purposes of assembly
and communication of public issues. Parks and streets are prime ex-
amples of this. Enforcement of content-based regulations must be
pursuant to a compelling state interest and, furthermore, must be
narrowly drawn to meet that purpose.145 Enforcement of content-
neutral regulations in the traditional public forum must be narrowly
tailored to fit significant governmental interests, and must addition-
ally leave open ample alternative channels of communication.14 6
The second type of public forum is an area which the state has
opened to the public as a place of expressive activity. In Widmar v.
Vincent,147 a state university was prohibited from disallowing access
to certain facilities by religious groups. Having made these facilities
available to campus organizations in general, the university could not
arbitrarily deny access to other groups.148 The Court ruled that the
state could reasonably regulate the use of the facility, but that no
valid reasons had been offered to justify the exclusion of the religious
group.149
The third category of public forum is public property which is
neither a traditional place for public communication nor was it
opened by the state for expressive purposes.150 The Supreme Court
recognized this distinction in the following statement: "We have rec-
ognized that the 'First Amendment does not guarantee access to
property simply because it is owned or controlled by the govern-
145. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
146. Id
147. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
148. I& at 273.
149. 1d at 276-77. The university argued that its compelling reason for denying the
religious group use of the facility was to prevent a violation of the establishment
clause. The Court ruled that permitting a religious group to use a facility open to all
groups would not have the primary effect of promoting religion. Id. at 275.
150. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
ment.' "151 The standard for the validity of regulations in this type of
forum is as follows: "[i]n addition to time, place, and manner regula-
tions, the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, com-
municative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view." 152
Applying these tests to regulation of music is problematic.
Although the first category of public forum is fairly well defined, the
others are not. No clear test has been offered to distinguish between
a forum created for expressive activity and general public prop-
erty.153 Most rock music is played in places other than traditional
public forums, although occasionally a concert will take place in a
public park. Nonetheless, time, place, or manner restrictions are well
suited for live concerts and radio and television broadcasts.
Recorded music, on the other hand, is not played in a public forum
at all, but is bought and sold privately. Unless the stream of com-
merce is considered a public forum, these transactions do not fall into
any of the established categories of regulation.
2. Protecting unwilling recipients
Another class of time, place, or manner regulations are those
which protect individuals who claim a right to avoid hearing a
message they consider offensive. In Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak,154 a city-regulated bus company was engaged in the practice
of broadcasting radio programming, including music, news, and com-
mercials, on buses and street cars in return for compensation. The
respondent argued that the passengers should not be required to lis-
ten to the broadcasts merely because they were disposed to ride pub-
lic transportation. A majority of the Court found no constitutional
infirmity with the practice. 155 Nonetheless, it was ruled that the
state was free to regulate in this area and could protect those passen-
gers who did not wish to listen to commercial broadcasts, if the state
so desired.156
151. Id. (quoting United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 129 (1981)).
152. Id.
153. The Perry opinion noted that the parties agreed that the school mail system in
question was not a traditional public forum. However, the Court ruled that the inter-
nal mail system was not even a limited public forum, since there was no evidence that
the state had intended the system to be open to even a limited public use. Id at 46-47.
It is possible, therefore, that the finding of a public forum will depend primarily upon
the intent of the state when it assigned a use to the public property.
154. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
155. Id at 465.
156. Id
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In Rowan v. Post Office Department,5 7 the Court was faced with a
case in which the government did choose to protect the unwilling re-
cipient. A statute provided that any addressee may demand that he
not receive any future mailings from a particular sender. This regu-
lation was upheld as the Court ruled that there is no constitutional
right to mail unwanted materials into a private home.158
Application of this basis for regulation to the music context is not
an easy step. The normal purchase of recorded music is done volun-
tarily, so there is no threat to those who claim a right to not hear the
message. This does, however, provide a basis for regulating mail-or-
der clubs, radio and television broadcasts, and perhaps street
musicians.
VI. CONCLUSION
CBS Records has recently agreed to adopt an option plan. It will
either rate albums, or print the lyrics on the back of the album cov-
ers. At first glance, this solution may seem ideal. The problems of
practical impossibility mentioned by RIAA President Gortikov have,
as expected, disappeared. However, the problem is not resolved
when those bands which write about human excrement and bestial-
ity, for the most part, do not sign with CBS Records. At best, this
agreement may cause self-censorship of artists who include sexual
ambiguity and innuendo in their work; such devices are not obscene
under constitutional standards.
A self-regulatory system by major companies is neither uniform
nor effective. Without substantial compliance by the many neighbor-
hood-level producers, with whom garage bands like The Mentors tra-
ditionally work, regulation is meaningless. The obvious means of
avoiding feasibility problems is to pass legislation. Yet, while legisla-
tion is a solution, the complexities and difficulties discussed in this
comment suggest that this would impose a heavy burden on the regu-
lators. Perhaps the best solution is the one currently being pursued:
exhaust feasible, non-legislative alternatives, then consider the legis-
lative possibilities. Finally, as Zappa suggested, reevaluate the poten-
tial of effective parental supervision.
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